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IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION-PETITION FOR NATURALIZA-
TION-ALIEN, A VETERAN WHO SERVED HONORABLY IN THE UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES, AND WHOSE REQUIREMENTS FOR CITIZENSHIP ARE OTHERWISE
EASED, CANNOT BE DENIED CITIZENSHIP FOR LACK OF "GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER" SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF HIS HOMOSEXUALITY.
Petitioner,' an alien homosexual who had served honorably in the United
States Army for two years and had been honorably discharged, made ap-
plication for United States citizenship. Under section 329(b) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), petitioner,
as a veteran alien, had to meet less rigorous citizenship requirements than
other nonveteran aliens,' in that all he was required to establish was good
moral character. 3 Respondent contended that petitioner's homosexuality
would preclude any establishment of good moral character.' In the United
States District Court of Oregon, held, petition for naturalization granted.
A petition for naturalization under section 329 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act' cannot be denied solely on the basis of the applicant's
homosexuality. In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Ore. 1975).
The general requirements for naturalization are spelled out in section
316(a) of the Act,' but these requirements are eased in the provisions
dealing with veteran aliens.7 If it has been established that an alien is a
I Petitioner was Paul Edward Brodie.
2 Immigration and Nationality Act § 329(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1440(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as INA].
Id. §§ 316(a), 329(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1440(b).
Respondent, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, further contended that peti-
tioner's homosexuality constituted grounds for exclusion as an alien "afflicted with [a]
psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation" under section 212(a)(4) of the INA. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4) (1970).
Id. § 1440.
Id. § 1427(a). The section states:
No person . . . shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preced-
ing the date of filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously...
within the United States for at least five years and during the five years years
immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present
therein for periods totaling at least half of that time . . . and (3) during all the
period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral
character ....
Id. §§ 328-29, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439-40. Those veteran aliens who did not serve in the time
periods specified under section 329, or for the length of time specified under section 328, must
meet the normal citizenship requirements under section 212. Petition of Yui Nam Donn, 512
F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1975). Specifically ruling pursuant to section 329, the court in In Re Sing,
163 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Cal. 1958), held that it was permissible to add petitioner's one year
residence in the United States to his 23-month time of honorable military service, and
construing the statute liberally, the court granted the petitioner his citizenship. In United
States v. Rosner, 249 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1957), the petitioner had served in the Armed Services
honorably for three years, but part of the required service time was not active. The court
examined section 328, and concluded that the 3-year service stipulated in the statute did not
have to be active; therefore, the petition for citizenship was granted. In Villarin v. United
States, 307 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1962), an alien was granted citizenship under section 329 of
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veteran under the meaning of sections 328 or 329 of the Act, then the alien
need show only "good moral character" in order to qualify for citizenship.'
In evaluating the establishment of a petitioner's good moral character, the
court will not be limited to the preceding 5 years that is required by
statute, but can investigate petitioner's conduct and acts prior to that
period.' The burden of establishing good moral character is upon the alien
petitioner, since naturalization is a privilege, not a right."° However, it is
not entirely clear what petitioner must show to meet this burden. The
majority of cases dealing with the good moral character requirement have
dealt with the issue of what is not considered good moral character. Unless
there are extenuating circumstances,II petitioners who have been convicted
of murder," have committed adultery,'3 or have given false testimony in
connection with naturalization proceedings" cannot usually be found to
have good moral character. In Kovacs v. United States,'5 an alien who had
homosexual tendencies misrepresented to the naturalization examiner the
extent of his sexual activities and tendencies. On the basis of Kovac's false
testimony, his petition for naturalization was denied.
On the positive side, the courts have set forth several tests as to what
constitutes good moral character. The District Court in In re Hopp'" said
that good moral character was that which "measures up as good among
the people of the community in which the party lives."'" In United States
the Act, because he had performed honorable military service during World War II. The
petitioner in In re Gabriel, 319 F. Supp. 1312 (D.P.R. 1970), was similarly granted citizenship
under the above statute for his honorable service during the Vietnam hostilities. The peti-
tioner's service in the principal case fell under the same provision of section 329 as that of
the petitioner in Gabriel. While the record is not clear that petitioner actually served in
Vietnam, he had served actively in the United States Army during the period of the Vietnam
hostilities, and since the court applied the traditional policy of liberal construction, petitioner
qualified under the statute.
INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970).
Id. § 316(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(c). See generally Comment, The Evaluation of Good Moral
Character in Naturalization Proceedings, 38 ALB L. REV. 895 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Comment]; Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244, 252-55 (1952).
I" In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1943). See generally Comment, supra note 9;
Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244 (1952).
" In re R - E , 290 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Ill. 1968) (petitioner and woman lived
together responsibly, raised family, got married as soon as one of the parties got a divorce);
In re Edgar, 253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (petitioner abandoned by wife, kept company
with another woman, and married her immediately on discovering that she was pregnant).
2 Petition of Siacco, 184 F. Supp. 803 (D. Md. 1960); Petition of De Angelis, 139 F. Supp.
779 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); see INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (1970).
"3 In re C-C-J-P, 299 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ill. 1969); In re Zunker, 283 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); see INA § 101(f)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (1970).
" Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630
(1967); Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960).
See generally INA § 101(f)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1970).
476 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973).
" 179 F. 561 (D. Wis. 1910). See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244 (1952); 15 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 154 (1949).
'1 179 F. at 562. See also Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244, 256-84 (1952); 15 BROOKLYN L. REV. 154
(1949).
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v. Francioso,18 the court defined good moral character by way of reference
to an earlier decision, United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day.9 The Iorio court
had defined "crimes involving moral turpitude" as crimes which would
offend the commonly accepted mores, or the generally accepted moral
conventions current at the time.20 The Francioso court believed that such
a definition could be used as a criterion in establishing good moral charac-
ter, or at least, the lack of it.
Once the criteria for good moral character have been established, the
question then becomes whether an alien who has been lawfully admitted
into the United States can be shown not to have met the good moral
character requirement solely because he is a homosexual. Generally follow-
ing the tests set out above, the court in In re Schmidt2' found that a
petitioner for naturalization who had engaged in frequent homosexual ac-
tivities in the privacy of her home was not entitled to naturalization, as
such activity was not consistent with good moral character in accordance
with the ethical standards current at the time of the petition-1961. The
New York court added a qualification to the accepted definition of good
moral character, stating that the activity in question would have to be
consistent with ethical standards current at the time as the ordinary man
or woman would see it. The court noted that it would have to improvise
the response that would be made by an ordinary man or woman. 2
Using a different rationale, the court in In re Labady2l reached a contrary
result on this issue. Here, the District Court of New York found that the
petitioner had good moral character, even though he was an admitted
homosexual. The court made its determination from evidence that peti-
tioner had led a quiet, law-abiding life, had engaged in only private homo-
sexual acts with consenting adults, and had submitted to unsuccessful
therapy. 24 The court acknowledged that petitioner's actions probably vio-
lated the personal moral codes of most people, but concluded that peti-
tioner had probably broken no laws and noted that his behavior was com-
pletely private.25 Even if petitioner's behavior were found to be against the
law, the court said that such an offense would not necessarily preclude a
finding of good moral character. The good moral character requirement of
the naturalization statute was concerned with public, not private behav-
ior.2 6 Pursuing the traditional rationale, the court further argued that
homosexual behavior was not as offensive to the ethical and moral stan-
dards of the community as it had been in the past. Examples were given
18 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947).
g 34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 921. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 244, 253 (1952).
24 56 Misc. 2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Id. at 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
2 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
24 Id. at 930.
11 Id. at 927.
21 Id. at 928.
1976]
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of the public's tolerance and complacency with regard to homosexual be-
havior." According to the Labady decision, it was no longer clear that
private homosexual acts between consenting adults violated the generally
accepted moral conventions current in 1971.
It is clear that either the ethical or moral standards of ordinary men and
women are changing, the ethical or moral standards of ordinary men and
women are significantly different in different parts of the country, or the
courts are drawing different conclusions as to what these ethical and moral
standards are. According to Judge Learned Hand, "it is settled that the
test is not the personal moral principles of the individual judge or court
before whom the applicant may come; the decision is to be based upon
what he or it believes to be the ethical standards current at the time. '2 8
However, in cases involving the determination of good moral character, it
has sometimes been difficult to determine whether the court really is trying
to set out what it believes to be the ethical standards current at the time
or whether the judge is injecting his personal standards into the determina-
tion. This distinction is especially uncertain in In re Schmidt,21 where
judicial improvisation was relied upon.3 0 The problem with responsorial
improvisation is that there is a strong tendency for a judge to equate his
personal beliefs with those held by the majority of people. Having the court
"improvise" the response of ordinary people comes dangerously close to,
if not to the point of, letting the personal moral principles of the judge be
the true determining factor in the case. For example, while the district
court in Labady3" was located in the same state as the Schmidt court,32 the
Labady court reached a contrary result on nearly identical facts.3 3 It is
obvious that regional differences in attitudes toward homosexuals would
not explain these two decisions. Also, it is not convincing that the com-
monly accepted mores of ordinary people would change so significantly in
the 3-year period separating these decisions.3 4 Apparently these two courts
reached differing results because they either interpreted the same stan-
dards in different ways or let their own moral standards dictate their
decisions. In the principal case, the court made a stronger attempt to
ascertain what the commonly held standards on homosexuality were by
considering the changing laws dealing with homosexuals within that juris-
diction and the increasing acceptance of homosexuality by society in gen-
eral. For example, the State of Oregon, as of 1971 ended criminal penalties
27 Id. at 929.
" Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1961).
, 56 Misc. 2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
30 Id. at 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
31 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
11 Both cases were decided in New York.
The only distinguishing factor was the frequency of the sexual activity; i.e., in Schmidt,
petitioner was living with a partner, while in Labady, petitioner had a homosexual encounter
on the average of once a month.
11 Schmidt was decided in 1968, Labady was decided in 1971.
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for sexual behavior between consenting adults. Further, it is the policy of
the City Council of Portland not to discriminate in employment on the
basis of sexual orientation. In society at large, the American Psychiatric
Association has removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses.3
From this determination, it reached the Labady court's result.
It is unfortunate that more cases have not been decided recently on the
relation of homosexuality to good moral character. However, the Labady,
Schmidt, and Brodie cases are sufficient to show that the present tests
used in determining this issue are not satisfactory. The present tests are
very difficult if not impossible to apply, and there is ample opportunity
for a judge to inject his own feelings into the case. Even if these factors
could be controlled, very real regional differences in attitudes exist. For
example, the Brodie court, using the community ethical standards current
at the time in Oregon, validly found that a homosexual had good moral
character and granted him citizenship. In contrast, a court in Georgia
might find that a homosexual was not of good moral character under the
community ethical standards current there. It seems manifestly unfair
that a person might be granted or denied citizenship, solely dependent on
the section of the country in which he chose to live. This inconsistency in
application of the standard easily might result in forum shopping, causing
a great inconvenience to both the courts and to the prospective petitioners.
The issue obviously needs clarification, either by more specific statutory
enactments or by a conclusive decision of the Supreme Court. If the solu-
tion is statutory, the Congress should make the naturalization standards
consistent with the standards for entry into the United States. Before
applying for citizenship, an alien must gain entry into the United States
and, to do so, he must meet certain statutory standards. In keeping with
the purpose of the immigration statute-to admit into this country only
those people who will become law-abiding and useful citizens 3 -section
212(a) of the Act specifically excludes from entry people who are mentally
retarded, insane, addicted to drugs, infected by dangerous diseases, or
afflicted by a psychopathic personality .3 The legislative history of the Act
indicates that homosexuals would be excluded from entry under the "psy-
chopathic personality" clause of this provision .3 Thus, widespread adop-
394 F. Supp. at 1211.
Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1961).
, INA § 212(a)(1)-(2), (4)-(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(2), (4)-(6) (1970).
" S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952).
Existing law does not specifically provide for the exclusion of homosexuals or sex
perverts .... The Public Health Service has advised that the provision for the
exclusion of aliens afflicted with psycopathic personality or a mental defect which
appears in the instant bill is sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of
homosexuals and sex perverts.
Id. See generally 4 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 148 (1967); 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 3343;
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 1700-01.
A present reading of section 212(a)(4) of the INA reveals that aliens "afflicted with psycho-
pathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect" are excluded from entry. Prior to
19761
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tion of the In Re Brodie ruling will give rise to inconsistent standards, one
applying to the efforts by a homosexual to gain entry into the United
States and one applying to his efforts to become a citizen. Congress should
attempt to create uniformity in dealing with homosexuals at these two
separate stages.
As it stands now, however, the Brodie decision is an important one. It
uses the traditional tests on moral character to arrive at its conclusion, but
its conclusion is a rather novel position that is not supported by a long line
of authority. In effect, the court in Brodie makes a distinction between
being a homosexual who engages in private sexual acts with consenting
adults and being a homosexual who commits sexual acts publicly. Persons
in the latter category, according to the court, are the ones who are violating
the existing statutes against homosexuality and who cannot be deemed to
have good moral character. The court asserts that the statute is concerned
with public, not private morality. As such, the court has opened a way for
some homosexuals to become. citizens by overlooking their private sexual
preferences. Before they can become citizens, however, they must over-
come the twin hurdles of the "currently held standards" test and the
factual determination that their sexual preferences have only been ex-
pressed privately with consenting adults. While such tests seem fairer and
more equitable than the wholesale exclusion of homosexuals, it remains to
be seen whether these determinations will be judicially manageable when
applied on a case-by-case basis.
Walter E. Leggett, Jr.
1965, the phrase "or sexual deviation" was not deemed necessary, since the phrase "psycho-
pathic personality" was considered broad enough to cover it. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1952). Several notable cases and articles followed this view. See Boutilier v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967); Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906
(5th Cir. 1961); 12 ViLL. L. REV. 336 (1967). However, there was some disagreement with the
proposition that homosexuals could always be said to be afflicted with psychopathic personal-
ity. See Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 125 (1967) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); Note, "Psychopathic Personality" and "Sexual Deviation": Medical
Terms, or Legal Catch-alls-Analysis of the Status of the Homosexual Alien, 40 TEMP. L.Q.
328 (1967). One leading case even asserted that homosexuality could be fit into the phrase
"mentally defective." United States v. Flores-Rodriquez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956). Appar-
ently, this confusion was remedied by the 1965 amendment to the Act which added the
clarifying phrase "or sexual deviation," although there is no case law in support of this
conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1965), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1952).
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